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line, someone replaced the pebbles with 
beads and the grooves with rods, mak­
ing the abacus much more efficient.
In the west, the line abacus appeared 
first in France about the beginning of 
the thirteenth century. It was widely 
used from the fourteenth to the 
seventeenth century but the line abacus 
failed to develop into the efficient rod 
abacus, and consequently gave way to 
the more efficient cipher system.
Two basic forms of the abacus exist 
today. The Chinese abacus retains the 
form it had in the fifteenth century, with 
each rod of beads separated into two 
segments by a piece of wood called a 
bar. Above the bar, there are two beads 
on the rod, and below the bar the rod 
contains four beads. Each bead on the 
rod above the bar represents five times 
the value of each bead on the same rod 
below the bar, and each bead is ten times 
the value of the bead on the rod to the 
immediate right of it.
The Japanese abacus is exactly the 
same as the Chinese abacus except for 
the fact that only one bead is placed 
above the bar. The abacus is still widely 
used and contemporary Chinese and 
Japanese are proud of their ancient 
abacus and its ability to frequently sur­
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In the world of accounting textbooks 
the controlling interest and the minority 
interest are well defined. The controlling 
interest is held by the parent company, 
consists of a majority of the outstanding 
voting stock of the subsidiary, and con­
fers on the parent company the power to 
control the activities of the subsidiary. 
The minority interest is held by non­
related parties, consists of less than fifty 
percent of the outstanding voting stock 
of the subsidiary, and confers on the 
outsiders next to no power over the ac­
tivities of the company.
In the world of multi-national groups 
the controlling interest and the minority 
interest may not be so well defined. An 
increasing number of countries, es­
pecially less developed countries, have 
passed or are passing laws prohibiting 
foreigners, including foreign cor­
porations, from owning a majority of 
the stock of all corporations or of cor­
porations in certain industries. India1 
and Argentina,2 for instance, allow 
foreign equity participation up to forty 
percent; Mexico,3 Venezuela,4 and 
Iran5 generally limit foreign in­
vestments to forty-nine percent.
Since less developed countries usually 
suffer from a shortage of investment 
capital, the majority stockholders fre­
quently are financial institutions of the 
host country or agencies of the host 
country government. For the multi­
national group this outside majority in­
terest company is the minority interest; 
in practice it has most of the rights and 
duties of a parent company. For the 
American accountant this situation 
raises the question of how to account for 
the minority-owned subsidiary: use the 
cost method, use the equity method, or 
consolidate?
Minority-Owned Subsidiaries
The Accounting Principles Board 
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(APB) has neatly divided corporate 
ownership of common stock into three 
groups:
1. The investor company owns less 
than twenty percent of the outstanding 
voting stock of the investee company, is 
presumed not to exercise significant in­
fluence over the affairs of the investee 
company, and will use the cost method 
to account for its investment.
2. The investor company owns twenty 
to fifty percent of the outstanding voting 
stock of the investee company, is 
presumed to exercise significant in­
fluence over, but not to control, the af­
fairs of the investee company, and will 
use the equity method to account for its 
investment.
3. The investor company owns more 
than fifty percent of the outstanding 
voting stock of the investee company, is 
presumed to control the affairs of the in­
vestee company, will use the equity 
method to account for its investment, 
and will prepare consolidated financial 
statements except in extraordinary 
cases, such as pending bankruptcy or 
foreign take-over.
The division into these three groups 
has been made on the basis of two 
different arguments advanced by two 
official pronouncements.
APB Opinion No. 18 advocates the 
use of the equity method if the investor 
company has “the ability to exercise 
significant influence over operating and 
financial policies of an investee.”1 23*56 
Operating policies must be interpreted 
to mean the ways in which income is 
earned; financial policies must be inter­
preted to mean the ways in which funds 
are raised and used, including the use of 
funds in dividend distributions. In other 
words, the equity method is ap­
proporiate if the investor company in­
fluences the earning and distribution of 
income.
1 Ernst & Ernst, International Business Series: 
Characteristics of Business Entities - India (Ernst 
& Ernst, November 1970), p. 10.
2 Op. cit., Argentina (February 1971), p. 9.
3 Op. cit., Mexico (June 1975), pp. 7-8.
4Op. cit., Venezuela (June 1975), pp. 9-10.
5 Arthur Andersen & Co., Highlights on Taxes 
and Trade in Iran (Arthur Andersen & Co., 
February 1975), p. 31.
6 Accounting Principles Board, Opinion No. 18 
- The Equity Method of Accounting for In­
vestments in Common Stock, paragraph 17.
7 Accounting Research Bulletin No. 51 - Con­
solidated Financial Statements, paragraph 1.
8Ibid., paragraph 2.
9 L. Le Van Hall, "The Multi-National Corpora­
tion: Its Impact on Developing Countries,"(Com­
munities Economic Development Fund, Win­
nipeg, Manitoba, unpublished paper, 1977), p. 10.
ARB No. 51 states that consolidated 
statements are “usually necessary for a 
fair presentation when one of the com­
panies in the group directly or indirectly 
has a controlling financial interest in the 
other companies.”7 In the next 
paragraph “controlling financial in­
terest” is defined on a legal basis to mean 
a majority voting interest.8 Since a ma­
jority voting interest generally means 
majority representation on the board of 
directors, the parent company is 
presumed to control both the earning 
and distribution of income.
The enumeration of these criteria for 
selecting the appropriate method of ac­
counting for a stock investment points 
out the fact that the multi-national cor­
poration faces a unique problem. Its 
minority-owned subsidiary meets some 
of the criteria of all three groups, but it 
does not meet all of the criteria of any 
one of them.
The cost method may be appropriate 
because dividend distributions which 
generally require a majority vote of the 
shareholders or directors may be under 
the sole discretation of the majority in­
terest, i.e., the host country nationals, 
who may make dividend decisions for 
political reasons if they are controlled 
by or represent an agency of the host 
country government. In one year, for in­
stance, large dividend distributions may 
be desirable to finance other govern­
ment activities or to reduce a govern­
ment deficit; in another year small or no 
dividend distributions may be desirable 
to spur internal investment and increase 
employment or to show a favorable 
balance of trade. Under these cir­
cumstances it may be misleading to in­
clude the investor’s share of investee ear­
nings in its net income or in con­
solidated net income.
It can also be argued that under APB 
Opinion No. 18 the equity, rather than 
the cost, method is appropriate because 
the investor company in fact determines 
the operating policies of the investee and 
usually controls, or at least exercises 
significant influence over, some of the 
financial policies, such as the borrowing 
of funds and the investment in assets.
An argument can also be made that 
the operations of the minority-owned 
subsidiary are so well integrated with 
the operations of other related com­
panies that fair presentation under ARB 
No. 51 requires the preparation of con­
solidated statements. However, if the 
legal argument of ARB No. 51 is used, 
then such an investee is not actually a 
subsidiary and therefore cannot be con­
solidated with other legally controlled 
subsidiaries.
From the preceding discussion it is 
evident that the multi-national group in 
these situations controls all the opera­
tion and most of the financial policies of 
the foreign corporation. The one finan­
cial policy over which it has no control 
and over which it may not even exercise 
any influence is the distribution of 
dividends. The solution to this dilemma 
then hinges, aside from the legal argu­
ment of ARB No. 51, on the poser to 
determine the distribution of profits in 
the form of dividends.
As every accountant knows, earnings 
can be distributed in forms other than 
dividends, such as transfer prices and 
the allocation of general expenses. In 
fact, these rather obvious ways of dis­
tributing profits among related com­
panies have several important advan­
tages over dividends. For one thing, 
profits hidden in transfer prices escape 
the double taxation of dividends. For 
another thing, such profits may be 
transferred to countries with lower tax 
rates. Of more concern to a multi­
national group with stock investments 
in less developed countries are probably 
the foreign exchange laws. Quite often 
the restrictions on obtaining hard 
currency are more stringent for the 
repatriation of profits than for the pay­
ment of bills for goods and services. And 
of particular interest to the American 
parent with a minority-owned sub­
sidiary is the fact that it gets a major 
share of the profit in such hidden dis­
tributions, but only a minor share of the 
dividend distributions. Since the 
American parent company is generally 
more sophisticated in accounting 
matters than the host country, it should 
have little difficulty in hiding profit dis­
tributions in other transactions. 
Evidence of such activities is, of course, 
difficult to obtain. However, a Cana­
dian researcher found that in Tanzania 
nineteen out of twenty-three companies 
either managed or partially owned by 
multi-nationals were practicing some 
form of price management.9
Given the fact that the multi-national 
group controls all the operating and 
most of the financial policies, including 
some forms of profit distribution, of the 
minority-owned subsidiary, the 
American accountant is justified in 
treating this kind of investee like a con­
trolled subsidiary and in resolving the 
question of how to account for it in 
favor of consolidation.
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